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Abstract 
As critical systems are increasingly dependent on software and are connected to the Internet, 
insider threats will be of ongoing concern. For example, corrupt insiders could deliberately 
introduce malicious software into the organisation’s system to surreptitiously gain control, 
and launch online attacks via and against compromised systems. In this paper, we present a 
method that an insider can use to facilitate data exfiltration from an air-gapped system 
without using any modified hardware. The method presented here uses inaudible sounds 
transmitted from the target machine’s speakers, which can transfer data to a nearby computer 
equipped with a microphone. We demonstrate how inaudible communication bridge air-
gapped systems without any additional hardware. Our system is low-risk for an insider as it 
only requires one-off access to a system, and can be erased leaving little-to-no trace once it is 
no longer required. Finally we provide some recommendations for organisations to avoid 
similar data exfiltration techniques. 
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Introduction 
Employees have intimate knowledge of the systems within an organisation, and they have the 
potential to be a great threat to security (Choo, Smith & McCusker 2007). Insiders can 
unwittingly weaken security by responding to phishing attacks, accidentally installing viruses, 
or being fooled through social engineering, they can also take malicious actions against their 
organisation for monetary gains or for revenge (Choo 2008; Choo & Smith 2008). In this 
paper, we present a method that an insider can use to facilitate data exfiltration from an air-
gapped system (e.g. in a classified network), using no modified or customised hardware or 
cables. The method presented here uses inaudible sounds transmitted from the target 
machine’s speakers, which can transfer data to a nearby computer equipped with a 
microphone. The target environment used as an example in this paper is a classified work 
environment where there are classified, air-gapped computers in close proximity to 
unclassified Internet-enabled computers. In this paper, we will demonstrate how an insider 
can gain continued access to an air-gapped system through a simple one-off software install 
(e.g. via a USB), even once they no longer have physical access to the system. 
Related Work 
A malware dubbed BadBios was reportedly uncovered by security consultant Dragos Ruiu in 
2010 and has recently gained publicity (Goodin 2013).  BadBios is a controversial topic among 
security professionals with many believing it is not real and is either a hoax or an artefact of 
Ruiu’s paranoia. However, one of the notable features of BadBios is its reported ability to 
communicate between infected, air-gapped machines that are not otherwise connected via a 
traditional network connection. It is rumoured that BadBios uses high-pitched sounds 
inaudible to the human ear in order to communicate. This technique is ideal for a classified 
environment where traditional communication mediums are disabled or highly controlled. 
Flame, one of the largest and one of the most sophisticated malware ever discovered (Munro 
2012), uses Bluetooth to communicate between air-gapped machines. Bluetooth is a very fast 
and common communication medium. However, it is highly likely that it would be disabled in 
a secure environment and would not be suitable for data exfiltration in this case. 
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Many forms of covert data exfiltration exist. Yali et al. (2009) present a system called 
Sensitive Information Dissemination Detection (SIID), which is designed to detect sensitive 
data exfiltration by insiders. Yali et al. (2009) utilise signal processing and statistical methods 
to detect suspicious traffic communicating with the external network. The methods presented 
in this paper would not be detected by systems like SIID because it bypasses the traditional 
networking mediums. Other covert data exfiltration methods such as printing sensitive 
documents, copying data to a USB key, or burning a data disc, can all be monitored and 
detected easily (Giani et al. 2006). Methods such as these can also be avoided by disabling 
external devices on the air-gapped computers. 
Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Emanation Standard (TEMPEST) is the National Security 
Agency (NSA) codename for spying on information systems through leaking emanations of 
devices, mainly through electromagnetic signals. Many of the TEMPEST standards are 
classified but some recommendations have been published on avoiding accidental data 
leakage (McConnell 1995). TEMPEST describes a Red/Black concept of physically separating 
classified plaintext information (Red) from encrypted or unclassified information (Black). 
This separation is done through maintaining a strict separation distance and appropriate 
shielding. According to the document NSTISSAM TEMPEST/2-95 (McConnell 1995), Red and 
Black computers should be separated by at least one meter (39 inches) in distance. While this 
distance might be large enough to stop electromagnetic signals being detected, we will show 
in this paper that our technique can easily communicate over this distance. Attacks based on 
the TEMPEST principles require hardware to be installed on-site for the duration of the 
attack. If this hardware is discovered, then it can be used as evidence that a breach has 
occurred and could likely lead to the malicious insider being caught. TEMPEST standards also 
apply to acoustic data leakage, Genkin et al. (2013) demonstrated the ability to use a high-
powered microphone to extract encryption keys from a target computer. Genkin et al. (2003) 
managed to perform this extraction at a distance of up to 4 meters, simply by recording the 
sounds a computer’s power supply makes while the CPU is decrypting data.  
A recent article by Sanger et al. (2014) in the New York Times alleges that the NSA implants 
tiny radio transmitters into target machines in order to exfiltrate data, even when that device 
is not connected to the Internet. The article states that the hardware might be inserted by a 
spy, a manufacturer or even by a trusted user (Sanger et al. 2014). If a manufacturer can 
surreptitiously add hardware to a computer in order to exfiltrate data, then it is surely 
possible for a manufacturer or software vendor to embed some code on a computer.  A large 
downside to this technique is that there is physical evidence left behind; whereas a software-
only attack can be erased after it is no longer needed, leaving little-to-no trace. Software can 
also be unwittingly installed through many manipulative techniques; whereas it is very 
difficult to accidentally install hardware. 
Contributions 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first open source published work on using inaudible 
sound waves to exfiltrate data using consumer grade equipment. The methods presented in 
this paper require no physical modification or addition of hardware, and leaves no physical 
trace that a breach has occurred. Attacks using this method can be put in place by a malicious 
or careless employee, which would allow sensitive data to be exfiltrated over a long period of 
time.  
The methods presented in this paper will demonstrate that even an air-gapped system is not 
totally secure. We also hope to reinforce that the biggest threat to an organisation’s security is 
its own employees. 
Outline of Paper 
In the next section, we describe the system design and explain the design decisions made in 
the development of this system. In the following section, we break down the experiment set-
up so that others can reproduce it accurately. This section describes the hardware, software, 
and environmental setup used in our experiments. It also describes how the evaluation was 
performed and the data used. Next in this paper, we present the findings and give a discussion 
of what impact this research has on secure environments today. Finally in the last section, we 
conclude the paper and outline some possible directions for future work. 
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System Design 
The technique presented in this paper uses commodity hardware to transmit data using 
inaudible high-frequency sounds. Humans can typically hear sounds between 100Hz and 
20kHz, although the effective range decreases with age and exposure to loud sounds (Lee et 
al. 2012). Most commodity sound-cards operate at a sample rate of 48kHz, which gives a 
maximum possible transmitted frequency of 24kHz. In practice, however, we found that 
commodity speakers would not function when approaching 23kHz. This gives an effective 
transmission frequency range of 20kHz to 23kHz that we can use without human detection. 
We can also assume that there are no children or animals in a secure environment that might 
be able to detect these high frequencies. 
In order to encode data as audio we need to modulate it to convert the digital signal into an 
analogue signal. Phase-Shift-Keying (PSK) is very efficient for transmitting data via radio 
waves but we found that in practice it is not very resistant to a noisy medium such as audio. 
Therefore, it was decided to use the simpler Frequency-Shift-Keying (FSK) technique, used in 
FM Radio and dial-up modems. A very simple method to implement FSK is to output a 
frequency for binary-one, and for binary-zero (see Figure 1). While this implementation works 
very well at audible frequencies, at higher frequencies it causes the cheap speakers to crackle 
and pop, making the sounds detectable by human ears and destroying the data quality. By 
performing a simple Gaussian smoothing on the resultant signal, we can eliminate these 
detectable artefacts and improve the transmission quality. 
 
Figure 1: Example of Binary FSK (Ktims 2006) 
 
Error detection methods were employed in order to ensure that the data transmitted is the 
same that is received. Data to be modulated is broken into separate packets (see Table 1) 
containing a preamble, to signify that the packet has begun, the length of the data, and a cyclic 
redundancy check (CRC) to validate that the data is free of errors. 
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Table 1: Data framing 
PREAMBLE 
DATA 
LENGTH 
PAYLOAD 
CYCLIC 
REDUNDANCY 
CHECK (CRC) 
 
Different types of data require different error mitigation techniques. Data such as passwords 
and secret keys need to be transmitted with bit-for-bit accuracy. However, data such as plain-
text files can potentially lose characters and still be human-readable. Data is often lost in 
chunks, so if a packet fails to transmit whole words can be lost. This is a problem for text 
because missing “key” words can make a sentence hard to understand. To reduce this effect, 
the text can be permuted, effectively scrambling the characters, so that if a portion of the data 
is lost then it will result in only some characters missing over multiple words (Berrou et al. 
2003). 
Two-way communication provides the opportunity to obtain a much higher transmission 
success rate. The TCP protocol requires receipt of a packet to be acknowledged, lest it be re-
sent. We implemented a simple method following the same principles of TCP. Each packet 
included a sequence number (see Table 2), and the acknowledgements (see Table 3) were only 
transmitted from the Internet enabled host to the target machine. Separate bands of 
frequencies were used so that the signals would not interfere with each other. The return path 
for acknowledgements was given a smaller frequency bandwidth because it did not need to 
transmit as much data. 
 
Table 2: Two-way communication data framing - Data 
PREAMBLE 
DATA 
LENGTH 
SEQ # PAYLOAD CRC 
 
Table 3: Two-way communication data framing - Acknowledgement 
PREAMBLE 
DATA 
LENGTH 
SEQ # ACKNOWLEDGEMENT CRC 
 
Experiment Setup 
The experiment was performed using a MacBook Pro as the target air-gapped computer and a 
Lenovo X220 ThinkPad Tablet as the Internet enabled computer. Both devices have 16GB of 
RAM and an Intel Core i7 processor. The machines can both transmit and receive high 
frequency sounds up to approximately 23kHz. A cheap pair of external speakers was used 
rather than the internal speakers to control the directionality of the output sounds. Laptop 
speakers generally point straight up and are not ideal for transmitting sound over a horizontal 
distance. See Figure 2 for a diagram of the hardware setup. 
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Figure 2: Hardware Setup 
Interestingly, the data transmission worked even when headphones were plugged into the 
audio jack of the computer, albeit at a reduced effective distance. A standard pair of iPhone 
headphones was used and demonstrated the ability to produce high frequency sounds. A 
comparison between the speakers and headphone’s power at different distances was 
performed in order to show that data transmission is possible even when headphones are 
used. Figure 3 shows us that although the power of the headphone’s output is lower than the 
speakers, it is still distinguishable from the background noise floor of -80dB (at 20kHz). 
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Figure 3: Comparison of Power vs. Distance for Speakers and Headphones 
 
Each device was loaded with Ubuntu 13.10 so that the software environment was identical.  
GNU Radio1 was used to develop the prototype communication software, which was then 
rewritten into pure Python code. GNU Radio is an open-source software development toolkit 
that allows prototyping of software-defined radios by providing signal-processing blocks that 
can be linked together to form a full radio. GNU Radio generates python code that 
implements the software radio, this code can then be modified and extended to implement 
any specific features needed. 
The experimental environment was designed to match a typical open-plan workplace. Open 
plan workplaces are free of loud noises, especially high-pitched noises, so the experiment was 
performed in an environment with a low level of background noise. The human voice, at such 
a low frequency, doesn’t interfere with the data transmission unless it is so loud that it 
overpowers the microphone. Each laptop was placed on tables of equal height with no 
obstructions between them, and no other special measure was taken to reduce echoes 
between the two devices.   
In order to set up the communication between two devices, one-off access is needed to install 
a small client application on the target machine. An insider could maliciously install the client 
software in order to retain access even once they have left the company, or they could be 
tricked into installing the software so that an attacker could access the air-gapped computer 
remotely. The client application was tested against 40 popular virus scanners using the Virus 
Total online service and it was not detected2. This indicates that the communication software 
could easily be loaded onto the system without detection, and a more malicious payload could 
be transmitted later via audio. 
                                                             
1 http://gnuradio.org/redmine/projects/gnuradio/wiki  
2 http://www.virustotal.com/  
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Evaluation 
In order to evaluate the performance of our system, many different types of data was 
transmitted over various distances and the speed and accuracy were recorded. 
Two different methods were tested in this experiment, and each one was evaluated based on 
transfer rate, transmission distance, and exfiltration error rate. Method 1 evaluates the 
performance of one-way communication with a single speaker and microphone pair. Method 
2 uses two-way communication using two pairs of microphones and speakers to allow for two-
way communication. This method implements a protocol similar to TCP/IP that can signal 
data re-transmission if it does not receive data correctly. 
One thousand username and password pairs were used initially to evaluate both methods. 
Each username was a randomly generated 10-character string, and each password was a 
randomly generated 30-character string. Transmission rate is calculated by comparing the 
total time taken to transmit the data, with the number of correctly received data items. 
Next we transmitted 100 different 1024-bit and 2048-bit RSA secret keys. The payload size of 
the transmission packet was adjusted so that an entire key fit in a single packet. This way the 
whole key would be discarded if any data corruption occurred. Each received key was 
compared against the transmitted version to verify that no errors had occurred. 
Adobe PDF and Microsoft Word documents were also transmitted in order to test binary data 
transmission of large files. Binary data must be transmitted accurately or it will become 
corrupted. Due to the large size of the files, there is a higher chance that some data will not be 
transmitted and the file will be unreadable. In many cases, it would probably be smarter to 
transmit text from the document rather than the whole document. 
Findings 
The following table (Table 4) shows the results of the one-way communication setup, using 
headphones as the audio-source. This test is only included to provide context and to show that 
the power or loudness of the transmitter does not affect signal quality, but does correlate with 
maximum transmission distance. 
 
Table 4: Comparison results of transferring 1,000 usernames and passwords 
using headphones 
Types of Data Transmission Distance Transfer Rate Success Rate 
Username (10 characters) 
and Password (30 
characters) 
1 meter (~3.3 feet) 6.2 usernames and 
passwords per second 
100% 
2 meters (~6.5 feet) 6.2 usernames and 
passwords per second 
100% 
3 meters (~10 feet) 5.9 usernames and 
passwords per second 
95% 
4 meters (~13 feet) 1.7 usernames and 
passwords per second 
28% 
5 meters (~16.4 feet) N/A 0% 
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Table 5 outlines our results for the full set of test data using speakers as the audio-source. 
Some of the data failed to transmit but we have included the results to provide a comparison 
against Method 3, using two-way communication. 
Table 5: Results of Method 1 - one-way communication 
Types of Data Transmission 
Distance 
Transfer Rate Success Rate 
Username (10 characters) 
and Password (30 
characters) – 1,000 
username and password 
pairs 
1 meter (~3.3 feet) 6.2 usernames and 
passwords per second 
100% 
2 meters (~6.5 feet) 6.2 usernames and 
passwords per second 
100% 
3 meters (~10 feet) 5.3 usernames and 
passwords per second 
87% 
4 meters (~13 feet) 2.8 usernames and 
passwords per second 
45% 
5 meters (~16.4 feet) 1.24 usernames and 
passwords per second 
5% 
1024-bit RSA Key – 100 
keys 
1 meter (~3.3 feet) 2 keys per second 100% 
2 meters (~6.5 feet) 1.9 keys per second 98% 
3 meters (~10 feet) 1.7 keys per second 89% 
4 meters (~13 feet) 0.8 keys per second 43% 
5 meters (~16.4 feet) N/A 0% 
2048-bit RSA Key – 100 
keys 
1 meter (~3.3 feet) 1 key per second 100% 
2 meters (~6.5 feet) 0.9 keys per second 88% 
3 meters (~10 feet) 0.6 keys per second 65% 
4 meters (~13 feet) 0.3 keys per second 32% 
5 meters (~16.4 feet) N/A 0% 
50 Text Documents (1,000 
characters) 
Note: Only 10 documents were 
transferred at 5 meters due to 
time constraints 
1 meter (~3.3 feet) 4 seconds per 
document 
100% bit-success 
100% readable 
2 meters (~6.5 feet) 4 seconds per 
document 
100% bit-success 
100% readable 
3 meters (~10 feet) 4.4 seconds per 
document 
90% bit-success 
100% readable 
4 meters (~13 feet) 8 seconds per 
document 
50% bit-success 
80% readable 
5 meters (~16.4 feet) 50 seconds per 
document 
8% bit-success 
0% readable 
PDF Document (140 KB) 1 meter (~3.3 feet) ~10 minutes per 
document 
Not successful – 
Corrupted file 
Word Document (240 KB) 1 meter (~3.3 feet) ~20 minutes per 
document 
Not successful –
Corrupted file 
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Table 6 shows the results for the same dataset and distances as in Method 1, but uses two-way 
communication (Method 2). Two-way communication should increase the success rate by 
sacrificing transfer rate due to the need for data re-transmission. 
Table 6: Results of Method 2 - two-way communication 
Types of Data Transmission 
Distance 
Transfer Rate Success 
Rate 
Username (10 
characters) and 
Password (30 
characters) – 1,000 
username and 
password pairs 
1 meter (~3.3 feet) 5 usernames and passwords 
per second 
100% 
2 meters (~6.5 feet) 5 usernames and passwords 
per second 
100% 
3 meters (~10 feet) 3.8 usernames and 
passwords per second 
100% 
4 meters (~13 feet) 1 username and password 
per second 
100% 
5 meters (~16.4 feet) 80 seconds per username 
and password 
100% 
1024-bit RSA Key – 
100 keys 
1 meter (~3.3 feet) 1.6 keys per second 100% 
2 meters (~6.5 feet) 1.5 keys per second 100% 
3 meters (~10 feet) 1.2 keys per second 100% 
4 meters (~13 feet) 3.5 seconds per key 100% 
5 meters (~16.4 feet) N/A 0% 
2048-bit RSA Key – 
100 keys 
1 meter (~3.3 feet) 1.3 seconds per key 100% 
2 meters (~6.5 feet) 1.6 seconds per key 100% 
3 meters (~10 feet) 3 seconds per key 100% 
4 meters (~13 feet) 12.5 seconds per key 100% 
5 meters (~16.4 feet) N/A 0% 
50 Text Documents 
(1,000 characters)  
Note: Only 2 documents 
were transferred at 5 
meters due to time 
constraints 
1 meter (~3.3 feet) 5 seconds per document 100% 
2 meters (~6.5 feet) 5 seconds per document 100% 
3 meters (~10 feet) 6 seconds per document 100% 
4 meters (~13 feet) 20 seconds per document 100% 
5 meters (~16.4 feet) 13 minutes per document  100% 
PDF Document (140 
KB) 
1 meter (~3.3 feet) 11.6 minutes per document Successful 
2 meters (~6.5 feet) 14.4 minutes per document Successful 
3 meters (~10 feet) 18.2 minutes per document Successful 
4 meters (~13 feet) N/A Not 
successful - 
Cancelled 
after an 
hour 
5 meters (~16.4 feet) N/A Not 
successful - 
Cancelled 
after an 
hour 
O’Malley et al.  Information Systems Security, Assurance, and Privacy Track (SIGSEC) 
10 Twentieth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Savannah, 2014 
Word Document 
(240 KB) 
1 meter (~3.3 feet) 20 minutes per document Successful 
2 meters (~6.5 feet) 27.7 minutes per document Successful 
3 meters (~10 feet) 40.8 minutes per document Successful 
4 meters (~13 feet) N/A Not 
successful - 
Cancelled 
after an 
hour 
5 meters (~16.4 feet) N/A Not 
successful - 
Cancelled 
after an 
hour 
 
Discussion 
The results show that data transmission is reliable up to two or three meters away, and using 
two-way communication can extend the limit up to four or five meters. Two-way 
communication improves the success rate but sacrifices transfer speed due to the number of 
re-transmissions required. However, this is not an issue because data exfiltration can be 
undertaken overnight. By comparing the results of the two audio-sources, speakers and 
headphones, an interesting trend is can be seen. Headphones were more effective at 
transferring data at three meters than the speakers were. This could indicate that the 
headphones are better at producing high-frequency sounds than the cheap speakers, or it 
could show that the power of the speakers is too high and we are getting interference from 
echoes and reflected signals. 
The results indicate that our method is a viable threat to secure environments, and it could be 
used by insiders in a variety of ways to exfiltrate data from secure air-gapped systems. The 
advantage of our approach is that it can be implemented purely in software and does not 
require any special hardware modifications. This means that an insider could install a small 
piece of software, and an attacker could then gain long-term access to the infected system. 
Our results show that the transmission rates are quite slow compared to traditional 
communication methods, however it can be made quite reliable and it allows two-way 
communication with an infected machine over a long period of time. It is not unreasonable to 
think that an attacker could transmit some very sensitive data using this method. The 
methods presented here aren’t just applicable to staff with a valid login, a cleaner or 
contractor could potentially infect a secure machine with one-off access using a USB key. 
Covert data exfiltration methods are quite often very high risk to the insider. For example, if 
an employee is caught smuggling a stack of printed documents from the building then they 
have no defence if they are caught. The methods presented in this paper, however, are low 
risk. A simple software install is performed once, and then further access to the system can be 
performed covertly. Once the access is no longer required, the software can be signalled to 
erase itself and leave no physical trace, whereas some of the attacks presented in the Related 
Research section of this paper would leave some hardware behind. This hardware would 
either need to be recovered, increasing the risk of being caught, or abandoned, which would 
show evidence of the breach if it was ever discovered. 
Employees can unwittingly or maliciously install the communication software presented here, 
which can then be used to gain remote access to an air-gapped, secure system. In contrast to 
methods that require hardware modifications, software can be installed by accident or 
bundled into legitimate software. Many hardware modifications cannot be accidentally 
performed, and require the attacker to directly manipulate the system hardware. A software-
only solution has the potential to be installed without any physical access to the site or 
hardware, through a variety of difficult techniques used to trick the employees into facilitating 
its install. A disgruntled employee could potentially use this system to retain access to an air-
gapped secure network even once they are fired or lose physical access. 
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Conclusion and Future Work 
In summary, we have demonstrated the ability to exfiltrate data from an air-gapped system 
covertly, without any hardware modifications. The method we have presented in this paper, 
however, has many challenges to face. Commodity hardware is not designed to handle high 
frequencies outside of the human audible spectrum. High frequency signals cannot travel very 
far in air, and lose power on every reflection or echo. Yet even with these challenges, our 
system was still able to demonstrate reliable data transmission.  
In the future, more complicated signal processing can be performed in order to correctly 
handle reflected signals. This would allow communication in a broader range of situations. 
Further transmission distances could be achieved by using intermediate devices as relay 
stations. These relay stations could repeat the signal so that the attacker could receive the data 
at a further distance. Transmission bandwidth can be improved by utilising more frequencies 
within the 20-23kHz range, or even by using multiple infected machines to transmit parts of 
the same data independently. 
Currently our system can only communicate between two machines. However, we could 
potentially implement similar techniques used in Wi-Fi communication and produce a one-
to-many communication protocol. This would allow a single command server to receive data 
from multiple infected targets. Infected machines might also be able to communicate with 
each other in order to roughly map out the physical layout of the environment. 
Many of the limitations faced by our system are caused by the commodity hardware. If the 
attacker was able to install high-quality directional microphones in the target environment, 
then the maximum transmission distance might be significantly improved. 
In conclusion, we would like to recommend that air-gapped computers should not be fitted 
with audio output devices as most air-gapped computers do not have a legitimate use for 
audio output devices. Headphones may be used but must be unplugged when not needed 
because we have shown that they can also effectively transmit data. Employees must remain 
vigilant that their computers do not make unusual sounds because it could potentially be data 
transmissions. Care must also be taken when adding any peripheral device to a computer to 
ensure that it cannot be used for covert data communication. 
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